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This study examines beliefs concerning the content of history, the meaning of Second 
World War (WWII) and the evaluation of historical events in relation to pro-war attitudes. 
Participants were 1183 university students from Spain, Portugal, Argentina, Brazil, Peru 
and Cape Verde. Four supra-level dimensions in the representations of the past were found: 
History as progress and leaders-oriented, history as focused on justifying calamities, history 
as violence and catastrophe, and history as meaningless. The prevalent positive beliefs about 
history were linked with enthusiasm to fight in a future war for one’s country.
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Creencias históricas, significados de hechos históricos y cultura de guerra
Se estudiaron las creencias sobre el contenido de la historia, el significado de la Segunda 
Guerra Mundial y la evaluación de eventos históricos en relación con una actitud favorable 
a la guerra. Los participantes fueron 1183 estudiantes universitarios de España, Portugal, 
Argentina, Brasil, Perú y Cabo Verde. Se encontraron cuatro grandes dimensiones en las 
representaciones sobre el pasado: la historia como proceso de progreso y dirigida por líderes; 
la historia compuesta por calamidades que se deben aceptar; la historia como violencia y 
catástrofes; y, la historia como carente de sentido. La prevalente visión positiva de la historia 
se asoció a una actitud favorable a luchar en una nueva guerra.
Palabras clave: representaciones sociales, historia, núcleo central, violencia colectiva.
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Some evidence suggests that people in many nations share universal 
elements of collective memory or hegemonic beliefs about the world 
history. Indeed, previous research concerning social representations of 
history and wars has shown a large degree of cross-national consensus 
with European history and Western cultural events being central, war-
related events and leaders perceived as more prominent, and with some 
degree of nationalism and ethnoentrism being especially evident in 
nominations of leaders (Glowsky, Ellermann, Kromeier & Andorfer, 
2008; Liu et al., 2005, 2009; Pennebaker, Páez & Deschamps, 2006). 
Yet, little is known about the content and interpretation of social 
representations of past collective violence in general, or with respect to 
specific events of worldwide importance like WWII. WWII appears 
as a feature of the central nucleus of the social representations of 
history (Abric, 1994): It was mentioned as one of the most important 
historical events in more than 30 nations (Glowsky et al., 2008; 
Pennebaker et al., 2006). Interpretations about the representation and 
meaning of world history in general and WWII in particular might 
be crucial for establishing a world-wide “culture of peace” and the 
diminution of collective aggressive behavior. For instance, do people 
believe that WWII was a just war, a necessary war, or was it for them 
a social catastrophe? Is world history a story of progress, the unfolding 
of a divine plan, or a bad joke? Each interpretation carries different 
implications for the future. For this reason, in this study we focused 
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on the character of beliefs about the content of universal history and 
the meaning of WWII, as well as on the evaluation of negative violent 
versus positive progress-oriented historical events, in relationship with 
a pro-war attitude or willingness to fight for one’s own country.
History as a product of war versus sociostructural view of the past 
and willingness to fight
There is evidence for the predominance of a vision of “violence 
as the main factor of history narrative” among lay people. Revolutions 
and wars are the most mentioned and rated as the most important 
events in the last millennium, whereas the advance of science and 
technology, including the industrial revolution, are less mentioned 
in free recall of history tasks. In Liu et al.’s (2005) study, participants 
recalled events related to warfare as being the most important above all 
other categories. A more recent study by Liu et al. (2009) confirmed 
that war-related events are considered crucial for social representations 
of universal history. Warfare and collective violence accounted for 48% 
and politics for 27% of events nominated as important. In addition, 
45% of leaders named were known for their roles in wars and other 
collective violence events. In fact, two thirds of nominated historical 
events were negative because of the predominance of warfare, with 
states often born out of violence. This pattern suggests a naive theory of 
history among lay people, where great things (states) come out of great 
suffering and the actions of political leaders are central to progress in 
history. In spite of the development of social sciences emphasizing the 
role of structural factors and long-term perspective collective processes 
in history, people’s lay beliefs reproduce the philosophy of history as a 
product of violence and “great men” (Moscovici, 1983).
Why are wars, particularly WWII, so relevant or belong to the 
central nucleus of spontaneously evoked representations of history? A 
classic idea of collective memory (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983) is that 
social representations of past historical events possess a motivational 
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function as they prompt groups to act collectively, justify actions of 
the in-group towards the out-group (Liu & Hilton, 2005), and are 
anchored in historical experience and cultural values (Páez et al., 2008). 
With regard to wars, there might be at least five factors accounting 
for such an effect: 
1. A bias towards negative and extreme events: Even though wars 
produced only 2% of the 20th century’s death toll (Layard, 2005), 
people stress the role of political violence in world history because 
extreme and negative events like wars have a greater impact on 
individual’s perception and cognition (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Finkenauer & Vohs, 2001). The far more deadly factor of disease 
is virtually collectively forgotten.
2. Wars are “good stories”: Wars are also remembered because they 
constitute instances of good narrative historical events. A good 
narrative has a causal beginning, an exciting plot, characters 
that one can identify with, and an ending of moral relevance 
or significance. Fights and wars are especially “narratable”; they 
have a protagonist/antagonist, a beginning/action/ending (Liu & 
László, 2007), and this makes them more salient in memory. 
3. War is central for building nations and states: The foundational 
events in a nation’s history, like an independence war or wars 
with other countries, have profound implications for justifying 
categories. As the well known historian sociologist Charles Tilly 
(1975) asserts, war makes states, and the states make war. These 
actual processes are reflected in lay beliefs about history which 
reproduce state-based narratives of history, transmitted by official 
education and institutional activities like commemorations, and 
cultivate a “culture of war” (conflict, hate and violence) (Páez & 
Liu, in press).
4. More specifically, WWII is a recent, three generation old collective 
event in communicative memory: People tend to remember “fresh 
events” which are anchored in direct experience and communicative 
memory or more accessible, face-to-face interaction. Britons were 
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more likely to remember WWII than were Americans by a margin 
of 16%, probably because the British nation experienced the war 
much more directly and personally (Schuman & Scott, 1989; Scott 
& Zac, 1993). Also, various authors suggest that three generations 
is the maximum time to retain historical events as vivid (Candau, 
2005; Páez et al., 2008; Pennebaker, Páez & Rimé, 1997). 
5. WWII really was a central historical turning point: A lot of 
countries were involved in the war, and the death toll, in particular 
civil one, was important. Whereas in WWI 5% of casualties were 
civilian, in WWII 60% of the victims included non combatants. 
WWII had important consequences, was associated with the fall of 
historical colonial empires and with the reconstruction of political 
systems in Europe and Asia (Hobsbawm, 2009). WWII serves as 
a part of the core representation of world history, anchoring new 
historical or political events (Liu et al., 2005).
The prevalence of a social representation of history as a process 
of collective violence is also confirmed by new research using a closed-
ended questionnaire showing that historical calamities centered on 
violence are the most coherent concept across 30 societies’ evaluations 
of historical events (Liu et al., 2010). However, another recent study 
with Spanish and Portuguese speaking samples using the same format 
(Techio et al., 2010) revealed that wars, and among them WWII, were 
rated as important and negative historical events, but wars were not 
perceived as more relevant than the Industrial Revolution, insinuating 
that people are aware of the importance of long-term socioeconomic 
factors in world history when prompted about them. In other terms, 
the warfare’s centrality hypothesis was not confirmed. At odds with 
previous studies, war and politics-related events were not perceived as 
more important than socioeconomic trends in closed-ended ratings. 
It was concluded that even if wars are more vivid in free recall, and 
collective violence appears as the main factor mentioned spontaneously 
when remembering the past, semantic knowledge reinforces a socio-
economic and technological view of the history, so that social and 
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structural factors are recognized as important and prevail in more 
reflexive and less spontaneous thinking about history. What is more, 
Spanish and Portuguese speaking nations included in Techio et al.’s 
(2010) research were not directly involved in WWII, which might have 
altered social representations of the past within this context.
Nonetheless, the key question is not only what kind of social 
representations of the past prevail, but also whether they strengthen 
the “culture of war” or “culture of peace”. A classic example of the 
implicit theory of history as a product of violence is Marx and Engel’s 
statement that “force is the midwife of history” (Marx & Engels, 
1974) and previous historical research points out that agreement with 
such an interpretation of history could be associated with favourable 
attitudes towards participation in war. In this view, war is necessary 
for cultural evolution. In the same vein, a belief in “great men” or 
leaders as main actors at the history’s arena could be related to the 
emphasis on obedience to the authorities of high status, which could 
also reinforce favourable attitudes towards the use of force, especially if 
these leaders endorse and justify the use of force (Moscovici, 1983). On 
the other hand, the agreement with the importance of socio-economics 
factors in history might be negatively related to a pro-war attitude. 
For instance, the belief in the centrality of economic development 
for social evolution was an important ideological factor that fueled 
the reformism and the abandonment of revolutionary violence by the 
Social-Democratic Party in the 19th and 20th centuries (Luxemburg, 
2009; Marx & Engels, 1974).
Thus, in this study we aimed to analyze the structure and 
explanatory value of lay beliefs concerning the interpretation of world 
history in the Spanish and Portuguese speaking context. We believe 
there exists a lay view or lay version of “history as created by violence” 
and directed by leaders, although —due to the fact that nations in 
the analysis were not directly involved in WWII— a view of history 
as shaped by technology and socioeconomic changes might be also 
prevailing. The first view of history would be expected to relate 
positively to willingness to fight, while the latter one negatively. 
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Warfare: Justification versus social catastrophe and willingness to fight
Should warfare play one of the central roles in social representations 
of the past, then individuals are faced with the cognitive challenge of 
dealing with its meaning. One strategy is to justify the past collective 
violence, especially actions of the in-group towards the out-group 
(Liu & Hilton, 2005), while the other is to adopt a generic attitude of 
criticism of use of force and stress its negative outcomes. 
With respect to the historical experience of WWII, a better recall and 
a positive evaluation of it were associated with having been a victorious 
nation, and involve a stronger willingness to fight for the nation in a 
hypothetic future war (Páez et al., 2008). Such findings suggest a form 
of vicarious trans-generational learning in the justification of violence, 
whereby representations of past “just wars” and the experience of victory 
reinforce a culture of warfare. Particularly, Eurocentric representations 
focused on the recent past would provide a privileged position for the 
victorious Western powers of WWII to take action in the international 
arena in a way that is perceived as legitimate, when compared to other 
nations. The claim to be “defenders of the free world” comes more easily 
to the United States and United Kingdom than to other nations given 
the process and outcome of WWII. These representations of the past, 
dominant in Anglo-Saxon nations, may constitute an explanatory factor 
for their propensity to be involved in new wars, but it is less clear how 
they will impact lay beliefs in Hispanic and Lusophone countries.
Thus, WWII receives a positive connotation as a just or necessary 
war in the context of allied nations. In Anglo-Saxon and Russian 
collective memories, WWII was the “last good war” or Great Patriotic 
War (Emelyanova, 2002; Neal, 2005; Wertsch, 2002). As Wertsch 
(2002) argues, such a label is a condensation of the important positive 
narrative template “triumph-over-alien-forces” especially prevalent in 
Russia. In Asian social memories, WWII may have additional meanings 
of being an anti-colonialist and independence war (Liu et al., 2005). 
In a study about social representations of the past, Chinese mentioned 
WWII with two different labels: World War and Sino-Japanese War. 
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Seventeen percent of the respondents mentioned Sino-Japanese War 
(1931-1945) as a distinctive event versus 81% recalling WWII. The 
evaluation of the former independence war, which ended up in the 
defeat of the Japanese, was more positive than the evaluation of WWII 
(Pennebaker et al., 2006). This pattern confirms that attributing to 
WWII a sense of justness and of a nation’s fight for independence 
facilitates a more positive evaluation of this war. 
On the opposite side, defeated nations do not reinforce a positive 
view of “national warriors” - even if they conceal more negative 
aspects of their participation in WWII as in the case of German social 
representations stressing the “normality” and decency of German Army. 
Usually, defeated countries remember their in-group’s suffering as a 
major part of war’s legacy and highlight and teach the new generations 
about the negative effects of wars as social catastrophes (Páez & Liu, in 
press). These representations of WWII, such as the Japanese emphasis 
on the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, could explain why 
defeated nations report low willingness to fight in a new war for the 
nation (Páez et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2010).
Nevertheless, there is still little research dedicated to the central 
meanings attributed to WWII and how they relate to willingness to 
fight in a new war. We hypothesize that explaining WWII as a just and 
necessary war in history, with positive political (e. g. the creation of 
the United Nations) (UN) and technological consequences, reinforces 
a pro-war attitude, whereas perceiving WWII as a social catastrophe 
is associated not only to a more negative evaluation of this episode of 
collective violence, but also to less readiness to fight in a new war.
Evaluation of historical events: Calamities versus progress and 
willingness to fight
To achieve a more holistic view of lay philosophy of history we 
took into account the evaluation of historical calamities and progress-
related historical events, namely the rating of concrete events in history. 
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In previous research studies wars were mostly rated as neutral and 
their general appraisal was negative. Even in the case of positive labels 
for WWII (Great Patriotic War, Sino-Japanese Independence War) 
the evaluation was neutral and not positive (Liu et al., 2009). In fact, 
a new World History Survey did not find a predisposition to glorify 
war, but rather a cultural variation in the degree to which wars and 
other calamities were negatively perceived. Using a 30-nation sample, 
Liu et al. (2010) found two cross-cultural factors in the evaluation of 
historical events able to predict willingness to fight for one’s country. 
The first and strongest factor was historical calamities, whereas the 
second one concerned historical progress. 
The first factor was composed by wars and other social catastrophes, 
like WWI and WWII, the Holocaust, atomic bombing, Vietnam War, 
Iraq War, but also Cold War, Great Depression, and Asian Tsunami. This 
historical calamities factor possessed robust reliabilities across country 
clusters, which suggests it is valid across the 30 societies surveyed. 
The second factor was less robust, and this historical progress 
dimension included technological and political events indicative of 
civilization advance in recent times, such as the digital age, the man on 
the moon, the foundation of the European Union and the UN, but also 
the creation/evolution of humankind. Non-Western societies evaluated 
historical calamities less negatively than Western societies did. The non-
Western samples not only scored higher on their evaluations of historical 
calamities, but also tended to be more willing to fight. Moreover, a multilevel 
analysis found that a less negative evaluation of historical calamities 
and a more positive evaluation of historical progress both predicted 
an increased willingness to fight for one’s country (Liu et al., 2010). 
Hierarchical and collectivistic cultures and willingness to fight in 
a new war: Glorification of war or a stoic culture?
Beyond evaluation of specific historical experience and the meanings 
attributed to history as a general construct and to WWII as a central 
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element in recent world history, there might be other circumstances 
which impact people’s willingness to fight for or defend one’s homeland; 
among them, values or ideology prevailing in the country. 
Because a less negative evaluation of WWII and willingness to fight 
in a war were found to be associated with hierarchical and collectivist 
values (Basabe & Valencia, 2007; Diener & Tov, 2007; Fischer & 
Hanke, 2009; Páez et al., 2008), it is possible to think that these values 
imply a more positive view of the past. Such evidence puts emphasis on 
a positive narrative of collective violence and war, perhaps based on the 
necessity of sacrifice for the good of the nation (see Liu et al., 2010). 
On the other hand, a national culture of peace based on human rights 
and democracy, as well as promoting post-materialistic values, can be 
linked with less readiness to fight (Diener & Tov, 2007). 
One possible explanation of the association between low social 
development, collectivist and hierarchical values and a favourable 
attitude towards war is the shift from an industrial and materialistic to 
a post-materialist society (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). This is associated 
with a shift from social representations of war focused on heroes, 
martyrs, and a positive connotation of collective violence, towards 
social representations of war focused on suffering, victims, the murder 
of civilians, and the meaninglessness of fighting (Lomsky-Feder, 2004; 
Rosoux, 2001). Post-materialist values probably erode “heroic war 
narratives” and positive attitudes towards collective violence. On the 
other hand, under conditions of scarcity, societies centred on survival 
and hierarchical values tend to ascribe more relevance to endurance 
and competition, sharing a particularly competitive view of inter-
group relations. This “collectivistic hierarchical” cultural syndrome 
could strengthen a positive attitude towards collective violence (Cohrs, 
Moschner, Maes & Kielman, 2005; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). 
Such less negative evaluations of past collective violence fit 
well with the content of Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) cross-cultural 
dimension of survival versus self-expression. Non-Western societies 
perceive the social representations of past socio-political violence 
(i. e. historical calamities) more as a part of the process of survival 
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and progress, whereas Western societies see them as something 
unimaginably horrible that cannot co-exist with their pleasant lives. 
Western societies consider past wars and socio-political violence to be 
negative and at odds with post-materialistic values-related narratives, 
which emphasize hedonism, self-expression and self-actualization. 
On the other hand, self-control, minimization and lower intensity of 
negative emotions characterize hierarchical collectivistic cultures. This 
suggests that a culture that accepts negative events and applies secondary 
or self-modification control to cope with negative emotions could be 
conceived as a type of stoic culture, which deals collective violence 
by means of endurance (Fernández, Carrera, Páez & Sánchez, 2008). 
Finally, a higher evaluation of progressive events fits well the traditional 
theory of modernization; nations with low social development, leaving 
traditional culture for a modern secular one, appraise war in this 
modernization framework; collective violence is a price to be paid to 
achieve historical progress (Hofstede, 2001; Inglehart, Basañez, Diez-
Medrano, Halman & Luijk, 2004).
This study examines the content and association of beliefs about 
world history and WWII, the evaluation of historical events, and the 
willingness to fight in a war, in samples sharing a cultural background 
(Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries), but belonging to nations 
of high, middle, and low levels of social development. To analyze the 
relationship between cultural factors, social representations of history 
and willingness to fight, we focused on accessible data concerning 
political ideology, importance of religion and national pride, as 
indexes of progressive-traditional individual-level values (with left-
wing ideology being low in traditional values and right-wing high) and 
nationalism, usually related to collectivistic and hierarchical values. In 
addition, it is important to note that none of the nations included in 
this study was directly involved in WWII, and so any results found here 
can be attributed solely to vicarious learning.
Summing up, first we compare the importance of lay beliefs 
about history and examine their structure as indicators of a general 
lay historiosophy, as well as their association with willingness to fight 
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in a new war. Agreement with socio-structural factors of history could 
be negatively related to a pro-war attitude, while agreement with the 
importance of leaders and justification of violence could be positively 
associated to a favourable attitude towards war.
Second, we analyze the meanings attributed to WWII and their 
association with the willingness to fight in a new war. We hypothesize 
that the perception of WWII as a just and necessary war, and related 
to progress, will be positively associated with the readiness to fight, 
whereas WWII viewed as a social catastrophe will be negatively related 
to pro-war intentions. 
Third, we analyze the evaluation of wars and social catastrophes 
on one hand, and of progress-oriented events on the other, and how 
both factors are associated with willingness to fight. We examine which 
type of view of the past determines a pro-war attitude: A “stoic” or 
endurance of adverse events view of war, or a positive view of progress. 
Fourth, we seek for higher order dimensions in the representations 
of the past concerning both a general view of world history and the 
“anchoring” effect of WWII. Then we examine through multivariate 
analysis the impact of beliefs about history, the meaning of WWII, and 
the evaluation of past negative and positive events on pro-war attitudes.
Finally, we explore the relation of social representations of the past 
with ideology, religiosity and national pride as indicators of hierarchical 
and collectivistic values. We expect that strong religiosity, conservative 
(right-wing) ideology, and national pride will be positively associated 
with enthusiasm towards participation in war. 
Method
Participants
A total of 1183 university students from three continents (Europe, 
Latin America, and Africa) participated in the study. The samples were 
comprised of students from: University of Buenos Aires, Argentina 
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(N = 356; 47.8% female; age: M = 22.52, SD = 4.705), University 
of Joinville and Tiradentes University, Brazil (N = 222; 73% female; 
age: M = 24.26, SD = 7.79), Pontifical Catholic University of Peru 
(N = 83; 74.7% female, age: M = 20.27, SD = 3.108), University of 
Minho, Portugal (N = 208; 68.8% female; age: M = 19.87, SD = 2.63), 
University of the Basque Country, Spain (N = 183; 72% female; age: 
M = 25.06, SD = 8.73), and Jean Piaget University, Cape Verde (N = 
131; 63.4% female; age: M = 24.47, SD = 5.71).
Procedure and materials
Meaning of world history: Participants were asked to evaluate (1 
= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) how well do twelve statements 
concerning history describe what they feel is the main message or meaning 
of world history. Items were drawn from diverse sources linked with the 
philosophy of history, and ranged from progress to cyclical explanations, 
and from violence as the main driver of history to divine intervention. 
For instance, the belief about force as a main factor in history was 
operationalized through the Maoist statement “Political power grows out 
of the barrel of a gun”. All the items are presented in Table 1.
Beliefs related to WWII: The measure consisted of seven items 
concerning WWII and placed on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Participants were asked to indicate the 
extent to which they agree or disagree with the explanations for the 
main effects and meaning of WWII. The items content ranged from 
WWII being a necessary or just war, the harbinger of technological 
progress or the creator of new social institutions, to WWII as a social 
catastrophe and leading to the Cold War. All the items are presented 
in Table 2.
World History Survey: We used an inventory of 40 events and 
leaders from the World History Survey (see Liu et al., 2010). This 
inventory included all events and leaders nominated in the top ten 
by two or more cultures, as reported by Liu et al. (2005), augmented 
by a few events chosen for specific theoretical purposes. Sample items 
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included WWI, WWII, the Industrial Revolution, 9-11, women’s 
suffrage, etc. This event inventory is both comprehensive and content 
rich, and can be conceived as a valid cross-cultural instrument. For 
the purpose of this study we applied only some events’ evaluation. 
Participants were asked to rate world events and leaders in terms of 
their positivity-negativity and importance. Following Liu et al.’s (2010) 
procedure, the instructions were: “The following questions are about 
your ideas on history. They are part of a world-wide effort to construct 
an international inventory of opinion about what is important and 
unimportant in history, and how people see these events and people. 
Below is a list of historical events. Please rate how positively or negatively 
you assess each event (on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 = extremely negative, 
4 = neutral, and 7 = extremely positive). Please rate how important or 
unimportant you assess each event (on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 = not 
very important, 4 = somewhat important, and 7 = of great importance)”.
Follwing Liu et al.’s (2010) findings, a score of evaluation of 
historical calamities was constructed by adding together answers to 
WWI, WWII, Holocaust, atomic bombing, Vietnam War, Iraq War, 
Cold War, Great Depression and Asian Tsunami. Another global 
evaluation of historical progress was created by the sum of scores of 
digital age, man on the moon, the foundation of the European Union 
and the UN, and the creation/evolution of humankind.
Apart from the list with historical events and world leaders, the 
questionnaire also included a measure of beliefs related to WWII and 
the meaning of world history.
Other variables taken into consideration in this study are: a) 
religiosity, measured by one item asking: “How important is religion 
in your life?” and placed on a 4-point scale (1 = not important at all, 4 
= very important); b) left-right wing political ideology, operationalized 
through the question: “Often, when people talk about political matters 
they use terms like conservative/ right-wing or liberal/ left-wing to 
describe their views. How would you describe yourself in these terms?” 
(1 = liberal / left-wing, 7 = conservative / right-wing); c) national pride, 
measured by a single item asking: “How proud are you to be a citizen 
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of the country where you are living right now?” (1 = not proud at all, 4 
= very proud); d) willingness to fight for own country in case there was 
another war, with the question: “Of course, we all hope that there will 
not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing 
to fight for your country?” (1 = definitely no, 7 = definitely yes).
Results
The structure of beliefs about history and its relation to willingness 
to fight
Participants exhibited a moderate support for the belief that 
history is related to progress, is related to scientific and technological 
development, and results from the acts of “great people” (all means 
are presented in Table 1). Belief in history as an eternal cycle and as 
the rise and fall of civilizations was also partially supported. On the 
other hand, the ideas of history as being related to violence, full of 
pain and suffering for humankind, teaching nothing, being a joke 
or a farce, expressing a superior plan, and subjected to objective laws 
were rejected. These results suggest that young educated people from 
Latin cultures share a representation of history as moderately associated 
with social progress and scientific development, and reject the idea of 
violence and meaninglessness as the main message of history. Paired 
t-tests revealed that all the means, except for the belief in history as pain 
and suffering, were significantly different from the total mean index 
calculated for the beliefs about history, confirming that agreement and 
disagreement with specific beliefs were highly relevant.
To examine the dimensions of lay beliefs of world history, an 
exploratory factor analysis with Varimax rotation was performed. 
The factor analysis revealed the existence of four factors: The first one 
explained 19.6% of variance, the second 13.9%, the third 10.6%, and 
the fourth contributed 8.9% to the variation in beliefs concerning 
world history (Table 1).
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Table 1
Beliefs about universal history: Means, standard deviations and factorial loadings
M 
(SD)
Factor I Factor II Factor III Factor IV
Progress 
and 
leaders
Joke, rise and 
fall, cycle, 
and pain
Laws and 
superior 
plan
Violence 
and no 
rules
Is the march of human 
society towards economic 
progress, greater freedom, 
democracy, equality and 
justice.
4.52 
(1.80)
.70
Describes technological 
and scientific progress.
4.66 
(1.43)
.70
Is the story of great men 
and women who change 
the world.
4.77 
(1.68)
.69
Is a sort of joke. All efforts 
lead one to laugh at the 
comedy of it.
2.10 
(1.45)
.68
Is the rise and fall of 
civilizations.
4.43 
(1.62)
.60
Is a cycle. Everything 
repeats again and again.
4.47 
(1.87)
.59
Is the story of the pain and 
suffering of humankind.
3.53 
(1.75)
.55
Is the result of a superior 
plan of a power greater 
than man.
2.47 
(1.66)
.73
Is the result of objective 
laws which apply no 
matter what human beings 
attempt.
2.82 
(1.50)
.67
Will teach us nothing. 1.47 
(1.15)
.28
There are no general laws 
or rules of history.
3.87 
(1.87)
.74
Political power grows 
out of the barrel of a gun 
(violence rules).
3.20 
(1.83)
.69
Note. N = 1147/1166. Only factor loadings equal or above .55 are showed.
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Factor I, denominated Progress and Leaders, included items 
related to beliefs about history as progress, scientific and technological 
development, and concerning changes promoted by “great men”. The 
items describing history as a joke, the rise and fall of civilizations, a 
cycle, and the suffering of humankind loaded in Factor II (Joke, Rise 
and Fall, Cycle and Pain). Factor III (Laws and Superior Plan) clustered 
statements suggesting that history is based on laws and has a superior 
plan. Factor IV included beliefs about history as violence and having 
no general sense.
Both, Factor I scores of belief in history as progress and actions of 
leaders (r(1083) = .15, p < .001) and Factor III concerning history as a 
lawful phenomena and expression of a superior plan (r(1083) = .10, p 
< .001), correlated positively with willingness to fight, whereas Factor 
IV, joining beliefs about history as violence and meaninglessness, 
correlated negatively (r(1083) = -.14, p < .001).
There was also a small correlation between willingness to fight, 
history as an eternal cycle (r(1147) =.06, p < .039) and history as a 
scientific and technological progress (r(1146) =.06, p < .046). Finally, 
participants who stated that history is based on wars and violent politics 
(r(1144) = -.10, p < .001) and those who admitted no sense of general 
laws of history (r(1134) =-.09, p < .003) had lower scores in willingness 
to fight.
The structure of meanings of WWII and its relation to willingness 
to fight
The central meaning of WWII was mostly connected to the 
creation of the UN (M = 5.73), to technological advances (M = 5.35) 
and to the reconstruction of democracy (M = 5.14), although WWII 
was also conceived as a social catastrophe (M = 5.18). To a lesser extent, 
WWII was perceived as being the cause for the Cold War (M = 4.13). 
Finally, participants disagreed with the idea of WWII as justified (M = 
3.99) and did not consider that it was a necessary war (M = 3.74). 
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An exploratory factor analysis with a Varimax rotation found 
three dimensions (Table 2), with the first factor contributing 35,2%, 
the second adding 17,6%, and the third 16.8% to variance. Factor 
I was composed by the reconstruction of democracy, technological 
advances and the creation of the UN. Factor II included beliefs about 
WWII as necessary for independence and as a just war. Factor III 
loaded items claiming that WWII was a social catastrophe and a cause 
of the Cold War.
Table 2
The meaning of WWII: Factorial loadings
M 
(SD)
Factor I Factor II Factor III
Progress Just and 
necessary 
war
Social 
catastrophe, 
Cold War
Formation of UN and Declaration 
of Human Rights.
5.73 
(1.40)
.85
Democracy and economic 
reconstruction.
5.14 
(1.56)
.80
Technological and scientific 
advance.
5.35 
(1.56)
.75
Necessary war (end of colonization 
and beginning of independence for 
many nations).
3.74 
(1.86)
.83
Just war (to stop Nazi, Fascist and 
Japanese aggression).
3.99 
(2.01)
.82
Cold War (establishment of 
Communist and Capitalist blocks).
4.13 
(1.74)
.88
Social catastrophe (casualties, 
destruction, human suffering).
5.18 
(2.31)
.69
Note. N = 1129/1158. Only factor loadings equal or above .55 are showed.
Regarding the relationship between the meaning of WWII and 
the willingness to fight, Factor I, WWII related to the reconstruction 
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of democracy and to advances (r(1058) = .11, p < .001), and Factor II 
- WWII as a just and necessary war - (r(1058) = .20, p < .001) correlate 
with a pro-war attitude, while Factor III, WWII as a social catastrophe, 
correlated negatively (r(1058) = -.05, p < .068). 
Evaluation of negative versus positive historical events and 
willingness to fight
The events perceived as historical calamities were negatively rated 
(M = 1.95, SD = .83) in contrast to the events seen as stimulating 
progress and, hence, positive (M = 5.50, SD = .92). The more positively 
assessed were the historical calamities, the more willingness to fight 
was reported by the participants of the study (r(978) =.09, p < .007), 
although this relationship was stronger for the dimension of events 
seen as historical progress (r(1048) =.18, p < . 001).
Higher level associations of belief about history, WWII meanings, 
and evaluation of historical events as calamities and progress
A second order factor analysis revealed the existence of four 
higher order dimensions in the perception of universal history 
(Table 3). Positive evaluation of progress-related events, perception 
of WWII as an antecedent of social and technological advance, and 
world history seen as a progress and changes made by leaders, loaded 
on the first factor which explained 19.8% of variance. The second 
factor, contributing 15% to the total variance, clustered a less negative 
evaluation of historical calamities and the conception of WWII as a 
just and necessary war. A third factor accounted for 12.6% of variance 
and was composed of WWII as a social catastrophe and world history 
as a product of violence and teaching nothing. The last factor (11.1% 
of variance explained) included the view of history as lawful and 
expressing a superior plan and the disagreement with the “ironic” view 
of history.
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Table 3
The second order factor analysis with first order dimensions of beliefs about history 
and the meaning of WWII
Factor I Factor II Factor III Factor IV
Progress
War and 
calamities 
justification
Violence, 
catastrophe, 
Cold War
Meaninglessness
Historical events as progress .80
WWII: Progress .75
History: Progress and leaders .71
WWII: Just and necessary war .75
Historical events as calamities .72
History: Violence and no rules .76
WWII: Social catastrophe, 
Cold War .73
History: Laws and superior 
plan -.69
History: Meaninglessness 
(joke, cycle, etc.) .64
Note. Only factor loadings equal or above .55 are showed.
Multiple regression analysis of willingness to fight on beliefs 
of history, meaning of WWII, and the evaluation of historical 
calamities and progressive events
An exhaustive model examining the impact of social representations 
of history on pro-war attitudes was tested by regressing the willingness 
to fight on the four second-order dimensions concerning the 
perception of history: Progress, war and calamities justification, 
violence and catastrophe, and meaninglessness, as well as on national 
pride, religiosity, and political ideology (to control for nationalism and 
rightwing ideology). 
132
Revista de Psicología, Vol. 28 (1), 2010, pp. 111-146 (ISSN 0254-9247)
Table 4
Multiple regression of willingness to fight on second-order dimensions of represen-
tations of the past and socio-demografic variables
Standarized B t p
Importance of religion .18 4.95 <.001
Political ideology -.06 -1.76 .078
National pride .27 7.73 <.001
Second order factor I: War and history as progress .10 2.88 .004
Second order factor II: Justifying WWII and historical 
calamities
.13 3.89 <.001
Second order factor III: Violence, catastrophe, Cold War -.02 -.58 .562
Second order factor IV: Meaninglessness .01 .30 .767
The model (Table 4) tested explained 16% of total variance in 
the participants’ willingness to fight. The second order factors of 
interpreting war and history as progress, and justifying WWII and 
historical calamities, significantly predicted the intention to participate 
in a future hypothetic war. However, history as violence, catastrophe, 
Cold War and meaninglessness factors did not predict pro-war attitudes. 
Finally, high national pride and strong religiosity were also significant 
predictors of the readiness to fight for one’s country.
National pride, importance of religion, and political ideology, and 
willingness to fight
All the dimensions detected in this study through the first-order 
factor analysis and those factors developed by Liu et al. (2005) were 
additionally correlated with socio-demographic variables which could 
be significant for the construction of social representations of the 
past. Regarding the perceptions of WWII, we observed that various 
meanings of the war were unrelated to political ideology, while beliefs 
in WWII as a just war and related to progress, as well as disagreement 
with the belief that WWII was a social catastrophe, were positively 
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associated with national pride and religiosity (Table 5). In relation 
to general views of history, beliefs in world history as progress, social 
development and the influence of transformational leaders, as well 
as the perception of history as following laws and a superior plan, 
were associated with national pride, religion and right-wing ideology. 
History as a product of violence and meaningless were related to low 
religiosity and national pride, and the latter was also correlated to 
left-wing ideology. Finally, the evaluation of historical calamities was 
unrelated to traditionalism and nationalism, while positive evaluation 
of progress-oriented historical events correlated positively with these 
indicators. Willingness to fight was strongly associated with national 
pride and religious importance. 
Table 5
Correlations of beliefs about history and the meaning of WWII with national 
pride, importance of religion and political ideology
National 
pride
Importance 
of religion
Political 
ideology 
(conservatism)
WWII: Progress .10*** .14*** .05
WWII: Just and necessary war .15*** .07* .02
WWII: Social catastrophe, Cold War -.09** -.11*** -.02
History: Progress and leaders .15*** .19*** .11***
History: Meaninglessness (joke, cycle, etc.) -.07* -.12*** -.10***
History: Laws and superior plan .12*** .18*** .09**
History: Violence and no rules -.15*** -.17*** .03
Historical events as calamities .01 .00 .06+
Historical events as progress .23*** .19*** .17***
Willingness to fight .39*** .30*** .07*
*** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05, + p ≤ .10
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Discussion
This study examined interpretive beliefs about world history and 
the meaning of WWII, and their association with the willingness to 
fight in a war, among Spanish and Portuguese speaking nations. 
Lay general historiosophy in Latino and African cultures
History as social progress and the result of “great men’s willpower” as 
a dominant belief and its relation to willingness to fight. The findings 
of this study concerning beliefs about the meaning of general history 
suggest that Hispanic and Portuguese speaking countries share a view of 
history as being founded on social progress and scientific development, 
while downplaying the ideology of violence as a burden of humanity’s 
past. There is also a common assent with the idea of history as a 
product of great men or transformational leaders. However, our results 
disconfirmed that the agreement with socio-structural factors of history 
associate negatively with enthusiasm for war, and that approving the 
importance of violence in history is positively related to a pro-war 
attitude. Quite the opposite, whereas the first correlates positively with 
disposition to fight, the latter correlates negatively. 
In addition, the belief in prominent leaders was found to go along 
with the socio-structural perspective. The stronger the acknowledgement 
of the importance of great leaders in history, the more eager are people 
to fight. It is quite striking that the same people who share a Marxist 
or technological and progressive view of history, simultaneously 
highlight the importance of great men. Nevertheless, taking into 
consideration the so-called Stalinist and Maoist cult of personality, it 
is understandable that a social view of history could be conflated with 
an individualistic willpower view of history (Hobsbwam, 2009). In any 
case, the belief in history as a product of great men correlates positively 
with the positive evaluation of leaders like Napoleon, Charlemagne, 
Sun Yat Sen, Churchill, Roosevelt, Washington, Lincoln, Kennedy, 
but also Jesus Christ, Pope Jean Paul II, Mother Theresa, and Princess 
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Diana, as well as —surprisingly— George Bush Jr5. On the other hand, 
such a viewpoint did not correlate with a positive evaluation of Hitler, 
Stalin, Mao, Che Guevara or Ghandi, and correlated negatively with 
the evaluation of Bin Laden and Sadam Hussein, suggesting that in 
our samples a belief in great leaders implies a belief in Western positive 
cultural heroes, and not in strong leadership associated with collective 
violence.
Rejection of an ironic view of history, partial agreement with a 
cyclical view and criticism of violence, and an “odd” mixture of objective 
and divine laws. It is also interesting that beliefs focused on history as 
an eternal cycle of repetition, a past full of suffering, and an “ironic” 
attitude towards history were only partially or not at all supported in 
Hispanic and Portuguese lay beliefs. Although they collapsed together 
in the same factor, there was more agreement with the view of history 
as a cyclic pattern or as a rise and fall of societies, than with the idea 
of history as a farce full of suffering, nothing but a danse macabre. Not 
surprisingly, that dimension, which joined somewhat connected yet 
still distinct views of historical meaning, was unrelated to willingness 
to fight. Probably, views of history as a cycle are more common in such 
cultures as India and China, in contrast to Portuguese-Spanish speaking 
cultures (Hofstede, 2001). However, in terms of specific items, the 
strongest correlation occured between beliefs in history as a repetitive 
cycle and more willingness to fight. The moderate levels of agreement 
with the view of history as a cycle or as rise and fall is, after all, not 
contrasting with such a tendency if one considers Giambattista Vico’s 
(1744/1973) doctrine of the “spiral of history”, which proposes that 
the advance in history is not necessarily a lineal temporal progression 
but can be visualised vertically as a spiral of repetitive, though always at 
least somewhat progressive, cycles of rise and fall. It would also accord 
5 Pearson’s correlation effects were as follows (N = 1007 / 1101): Napoleon: r = .11, Char-
lesmagne r = .08, Yat Sen r = .09, Churchill r = .11, F. D. Roosevelt, Washington r = .16, 
Lincoln r = .13, Kennedy r = .16, but also Jesus Christ r = .18, Pope Jean Paul II r = .23, 
Mother Theresa r = .15, and Princess Diana r = .19, George Bush Jr. r = .12, Osama Bin 
Laden r = -15, Sadam Hussein r = -.06.
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with a rough view of Latin countries’ recent historical experiences, 
containing both ups and downs.
The doctrine of objective laws was associated with the judgment 
of history as an expression of a superior plan – or the existence of God’s 
laws. Because a belief in objective laws of history belongs to the Marxist 
tradition, the unification of this idea with the belief of a supernatural 
plan or a religious view of history shows the extent of the ideological 
defeat of the left-wing tradition amongst lay people. Such a lay belief, 
that the objective laws and God’s laws go together, is an oxymoronic 
statement and stands against Marxist theory and theology, yet still 
might be considered evidence for a human need for a higher order, 
independently of the kind of force which would provide such order 
(nature versus God). 
On the other hand, the nihilist belief in history as escaping rules 
or laws and the idea of “violence as the midwife of history” collapsed 
together in one factor, suggesting that the philosophy of historical 
violence is not only partially shared but also has a negative meaning. 
Moreover, this view of history as a product of violence and chaos was 
negatively associated to willingness to fight. Whereas the prevailing 
sociostructural view associated with pro-war attitude would imply 
justifications of collective violence, stressing the importance of violence 
and chaos in history as a predictor of reluctance to fight in a war is 
related to remembering the suffering and negative consequences of 
collective violence.
Positivistic views of history and collectivistic expressive culture 
emphasizing sociability and positive interactions. In sum, it seems that 
Hispanic and Portuguese speaking nations tend to seek for positive 
meanings in history and reject a nihilist view of existence. One plausible 
interpretation is the emphasis on positive emotions and interactions that 
characterize Latin-American Portuguese and Spanish speaking nations. 
For instance, altruistic behaviour is more frequent in middle level 
collectivistic Latin American nations and Spain than in other cultures 
(Levine, Norenzayan & Philbrick, 2001). The so called simpatico 
culture socializes people to suppress negative emotions, reinforces the 
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expression of positive emotions and transmits a positivistic view of life, 
which is also a dominant pattern in Africa. Africans self-describe as 
“the smile of humankind”, because sociability and positive interactions 
are emphasized – even amidst collective violence (Okeke, Draguns, 
Sheku & Allen, 1999). This optimistic view of life in part explains why 
Latin American nations with limited social development report higher 
levels of happiness than similar Asian nations. In fact, national means 
of subjective well-being in Latin America are similar to those in more 
developed nations (Diener & Larsen, 1993).
The meaning of WWII and willingness to fight: Positive effects  
of WWII, disagreement with WWII as social catastrophe and  
pro-war attitude
As far as the meaning of WWII is concerned, positive beliefs about 
WWII, linked to events like the creation of the UN, the reconstruction 
of democracy and technological advances, were generally supported 
and converged into a single dimension of positive effects of WWII. 
Conception of WWII as necessary and just collapsed together in 
another factor, yet participants did not agree with these meanings of 
the war – at least in our sample of Latin Americans, Europeans,and 
Africans belonging to nations not directly involved in WWII. Among 
these nations, the acknowledgment that WWII was a social catastrophe 
was stronger than the belief that it was a just and necessary war. The 
perception of WWII as a social catastrophe loaded on the same 
dimension as the idea of WWII as a cause for the Cold War. Finally, 
our results confirmed that positive and justifying social representations 
of WWII were, as expected, positively associated with the willingness 
to fight in a war for one’s country, while regarding WWII as a social 
catastrophe was negatively related to pro-war attitudes.
In conclusion, the purposes and the burden of WWII were 
perceived as predominantly positive: It was seen as a reconstruction of 
democracy and as resulting in technological advances and the creation 
of the UN. Probably the main reason for this result is that none of the 
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cultures surveyed deeply suffered negative consequences from WWII. 
Only Brazil sent a token representation of forces to fight with the Allies, 
and all the other nations surveyed were neutral or bystanders of WWII 
(Páez et al., 2008). The Latin countries surveyed have benevolent 
interpretations of the meaning of history and WWII, in part because 
of the absence of direct experience with the negative effects of the war. 
The discourse of WWII as a just and necessary war appears to be a 
belief not supported by our Hispanic and Portuguese speaking sample 
of nations, in contrast to Asian and European nations. Because none of 
the Luso-Hispanic nations experienced WWII, the greatest calamity of 
the 20th century, for them progress may be more salient than calamity 
or the negative aspects of war.
Beliefs about history, the meaning of WWII and evaluations of 
historical calamities and progress: WWII and the central nucleus 
of social representations of history, anchoring processes and links 
with experience
A second order factor analysis showed that beliefs about history, 
ascriptions of meaning to WWII, and the evaluation of historical events 
could be grouped into supra-level categories. Less negative evaluations 
of historical calamities were associated with the perception of WWII as 
just and necessary. Progress-oriented beliefs about history and WWII 
were linked together with events as historical progress. History seen 
as violence was linked with pointing out negative consequentiality of 
WWII. And, finally, lack of rules and a superior plan was associated 
with seeing history as a meaningless farce or a never-ending cycle. The 
orientation towards progress in perceiving history and the indulgence 
in the evaluation of negative historical events were predictors of the 
disposition to fight in a war. One interpretation of these patterns of 
beliefs is based in the dominant role of WWII as a central event that 
helps to construct a general social representation of history —even for 
nations not directly involved in this event. WWII is a main feature of the 
social representations of history because it is frequently associated with 
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world history and is usually the top listed event in a free-recall task— 
two characteristics of events forming the central nucleus of a social 
representation (Abric, 1994). WWII is also linked to the anchoring 
processes of social representations of history. Anchoring implies a 
cognitive process wherein new social objects are integrated into the 
pre-existing patterns of representation (for instance, September 11 is 
like Pearl Harbour and Saddam Hussein is like Hitler) and it involves 
a social aspect in which a group gives meaning to a representation (for 
instance, the war against terrorism is just and necessary, like WWII) 
(see Jodelet, 2006). WWII not only forms part of the main nucleus 
of the social representations of history, but also serves as an anchor or 
central point when generating new meanings for more current events 
entering into public life.
In the case of the first factor, the attribution of a positive meaning 
to WWII (WWII causes the creation of the UN, promotes the 
development of technology and democracy) serves as an anchor for a 
positive evaluation of historical progressive events and for the general 
view of history as a process of socioeconomic progress and also the 
results of change produced by great leaders like Churchill, Roosevelt, 
but not Stalin, Mao, Che Guevara or Hitler. The factor which involved 
perceiving WWII as a just and necessary war —a view that was not 
supported by the majority of participants— could anchor a stoic view 
of history, which implies a higher acceptance of social and natural 
calamities (WWI and II, Depression, Tsunami, etc.). The prevailing 
positive beliefs about history as progress and, to a lesser extent, the stoic 
view of history as going through necessary calamities, are potential 
ideological basis of a culture of war. 
Finally, the other two factors, a general view of history as a 
meaningless joke or as a repetitive cycle on one hand, and with violence 
as the driver on the other, may be anchored by the negative meanings 
of WWII as a social catastrophe and as a cause of the Cold War. These 
lessons of history surprisingly are found to erode a culture of war rather 
than give rise to nihilism or resignation.
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At the opposite end of this implicit inductive anchoring process 
(that the perception of WWII anchors or induces a general view of 
history), it is possible that general views of history frame and help 
people to attribute coherent meaning to a specific event like WWII. 
A stoic view of history helps to build a less negative view of WWII as 
a just and necessary war, while a progressive view of history reinforces 
the attribution of a positive meaning of socio-political development 
to WWII. 
Beliefs about history, meaning of WWII, and evaluation of historical 
calamities and progressive events: Culture as a framework and the 
importance of traditionalist values and nationalism
As regards the importance of the cultural factor in the beliefs about 
history and the pro-war attitude, previous studies found that materialist, 
collectivistic and hierarchical values were related to willingness to fight 
in large samples (Fischer & Hanke, 2009), and that pro-war attitudes 
are anchored in a successful historical experience of war (Basabe & 
Valencia, 2007). However, our results support the alternative idea that 
materialistic, collectivistic and hierarchical cultures emphasize a stoic 
view of history, but not a glorification of war. A less negative conception 
of war and a more positive view of historical progress and progressive 
events were associated with a culture of war or higher willingness to 
fight. In our results a positive evaluation of progress-related events 
was associated with history seen as social and scientific progress, and 
as an effect of transformational leaders’ actions, as well as with the 
conception of WWII as a factor of social and technological advance. 
These positivistic and progression-oriented beliefs also predict the pro-
war attitude. This means that current positive attitudes towards war 
are not based on a glorification of violence, but on a “progressive” and 
leader-centered view of history. 
What is more, the association of the willingness to fight and a 
less negative evaluation of historical calamities and a more positive 
evaluation of historical progress with religiosity and nationalism, 
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suggest that these beliefs could be indeed related to traditional values 
like materialism, hierarchy and collectivism. The relative acceptance 
of war related to progress and a less negative evaluation of historical 
calamities can be interpreted as a mixture of traditional and materialistic 
values, that accept the negative side of social life as a normal price of 
the struggle for survival – and by this token war is viewed as another 
negative adverse event to endure. The importance of progressive 
events for the willingness to fight can also reflect a more traditional 
nationalism, associated to strong national pride, that justifies war by 
the advance and improvement of the nation as a last resort. Embedded 
in a modernization process, war is a price to be paid to achieve historical 
progress (Hofstede, 2001; Inglehart et al., 2004). The optimistic view 
of history can be also related to the simpatico culture or a culture 
that emphasizes positive aspects of social life, as we discussed above. 
In fact, a mixture of individualism and collectivism emphasizing the 
expression of positive emotions characterizes Latin nations and this can 
be reflected in the benevolent view of history that our results suggest. 
Furthermore, the progressive view of history and war could be 
related to the fact that our sample of nations recently lived positive 
events, like overcoming colonial rule in Africa or military dictatorships, 
in the case of Spain, Portugal, Peru, Argentina and Brazil. Some of these 
countries (Spain, Portugal, Brazil and, to a lower extent, Peru) have also 
experienced a recent period of socioeconomic progress. However, all these 
nations still suffer from social problems and, in some cases, experience 
collective violence, like colonial wars or political violence. For instance, 
Brazil’s military dictatorship in the 1960-70s, the thousands of deaths 
from the Peruvian guerrillas of Sendero Luminoso, the Argentinean war 
with United Kingdom and a brutal military dictatorship with thousands 
of missing people, Spain’s nationalist terrorism or the terrorism d’ Etat 
in the years 1969-1986, and the Spanish Civil War 70 years ago. But 
in accord with Páez et al.’s (2009) conclusions, it appears to be the lack 
of horror in these countries’ experience of WWII that anchors their 
relatively positive historical frames of interpretation rather than recent 
civil wars or civil unrest.
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Conclusions
Our study has shown the existence of four distinct ways or attitudes 
to understand history. Our study has shown the existence of four distinct 
ways to understand history. First orientation relates to a favourable 
attitude towards war and involves minimization and rationalization 
of negative consequences of wars and other historical calamities. The 
second attitude towards history is associatiated with commitment to 
progressivism and industrialization or —nowadays— informatization 
as tools for advance of humanity. On the other hand, such a view of 
history involves recognition of the importance of prominent historical 
figures. The third orientation criticizes collective violence which might 
be an indirect manifestation of pacifistic beliefs and approval for post-
materialistic values. Finally, the last option can be considered a strategy 
of avoidance, scepticism, sarcasm and distancing oneself from history.
These four factors that summarize our beliefs about history 
and collective violence form two orthogonal dimensions: Militarism 
versus pacifism, and meaningfulness based on progressivism versus 
meaninglessness based on nihilistic philosophy.
Further research is needed to analyze more profoundly intercultural 
variance, controlling for cultural values and the socio-economic deve-
lopment index for each country, preferably including a wider range of 
nations with different value profiles. In addition, it is recommended to 
broaden the sample by including the countries which were directly invol-
ved in WWII. It is also important to perform collective level analysis 
to examine structural and societal factors of cultures, beyond individual 
level analysis, as well as apply more confirmatory factor analysis to repli-
cate the results obtained with the exploratory factor analysis. Last but not 
least, it is crucial to continue studying social representations of the past 
and collective violence, considering that, based on our samples, the pre-
vailing stoic progressivist view of history fuels pro-war attitudes. Thus, 
the antecedents of this stoic view of history have to be found and used as 
a basis for strengthening these beliefs which could help achieve a strong 
and stable culture of peace, especially in the most threatened contexts.
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